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Abstract
This paper aims at integrating macroeconomic and institutional analyses of long run
dynamics of capitalism with material flow analysis. We investigate the links between ac-
cumulation and socio-metabolic regimes by studying French capitalism from a material
perspective since 1948. We characterize its social metabolism both in production- and
consumption-based approaches. We show that the periodization of accumulation regimes in
terms of Fordism and Neoliberalism translates into material terms. The o shore materiality
of Neoliberalism partly substitutes for and partly complements the more domestic material-
ity inherited from Fordism. The transition phase between the two socio-metabolic regimes
clearly corresponds to the emergence of the o shoring-financialization nexus of French capi-
talism indicating the shift from the fordist accumulation regime to the neoliberal accumula-
tion regime. Acknowledging that socio-metabolic regimes have their own logic, we highlight
strong inter-linkages between accumulation and material dynamics and discuss how materi-
als may be instrumental in shaping accumulation regimes. This work therefore illustrates the
relevance of combining institutional macroeconomics with methods and approaches derived
from Ecological Economics.
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1 Introduction1
Material extraction has more than tripled globally between 1970 and 2010 at a time where2
both population and economic growth slowed down. Global primary material use is expected3
to double by 2060, alongside the growth of in-use material stocks (e.g. building, machines,4
infrastructures). This ever widening material basis of our societies has potentially huge environ-5
mental consequences, e.g. natural resources exhaustion, additional greenhouse gases emissions6
or biodiversity loss. This is all the more concerning as material e ciency — the amount of7
primary materials required per unit of economic activity — has declined globally since 20008
due to production o shoring from very to less material-e cient countries and massive building9
of infrastructures in emerging countries, especially China (OECD, 2019; Schandl et al., 2018;10
Wiedenhofer et al., 2019).11
Yet, key economic indicators like the gross domestic product or measurement tools like na-12
tional accounting remain largely disconnected from the physical basis of our societies. This dis-13
connection results in the dematerialization of the representation of the economy (Pottier, 2014).14
At a time where planetary boundaries are all being exceeded (Ste en et al., 2015), it is therefore15
urgent to integrate a physical dimension to the understanding of accumulation dynamics and to16
the long run analysis of capitalism (Görg et al., 2020).17
Despite calls for integrating political ecology, political economy, environmental history and18
ecological economics (Muradian et al., 2012), few studies have undertaken to investigate capital19
accumulation dynamics and biophysical flows together. In this paper, we attempt at comprehend-20
ing in an integrated manner the socio-metabolic and accumulation regimes of French capitalism21
since 1948. To do so, we bring together two strands of literature that had yet to converse:22
Material Flow Analysis (MFA) and Regulation Theory (RT).23
RT provides an analytical framework to analyse the long run dynamics as well as the his-24
torical and spatial diversities of capitalism through accumulation regimes. An accumulation25
regime consists of “the set of regularities that ensure the general and relatively coherent progress26
of capital accumulation, that is, which allow the resolution or postponement of the distortions27
and disequilibria to which the process continually gives rise” (Boyer and Saillard, 2002, p. 334).28
These regularities are given kinds of production organization, income distribution and composi-29
tion of demand combining into a coherent regime through their dynamic compatibility (Aglietta,30
2015; Boyer, 2015). The term regulation (in RT and in the title) refers to the institutional31
forms embodying social compromises and thus enabling a coherent reproduction of the economic32
system over time through setting patterns of individual and collective behaviours. The institu-33
tional forms combine together in the mode of regulation supporting the accumulation regime and34
regulating it.35
MFA o ers a physical perspective on economies. It quantifies social metabolism, that is36
the way societies organize their exchanges of matter and energy with their natural environment.37
Social metabolism refers to the physical throughput of the economic system in terms of the energy38
and materials associated with economic activities, either as direct or indirect inputs and wastes.39
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socio-metabolic regimes correspond to human modes of subsistence, “a dynamic equilibrium of a40
system of society-nature interaction” (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1993; Haberl et al., 2016).41
Until recently, RT was notoriously blind to environmental issues and natural resources dy-42
namics (Cahen-Fourot, 2020; Chester, 2010; Zuindeau, 2007) while MFA has yet to integrate43
its approach into a political economy of capitalism. Nonetheless, both RT and MFA privilege44
long term analyses and attempt at identifying periodization of, respectively, accumulation and45
socio-metabolic regimes, their crises and the associated transitions, mainly from a methodological46
nationalist perspective.47
Two distinct accumulation regimes have been identified in the post-war era in France: Fordism,48
from the early years of post-war recovery to the mid-seventies and Neoliberalism from then on-49
wards. Fordism can be characterized by high productivity gains supporting a social compromise50
between labour and capital in favour of labour resulting into strong redistributive institutions51
such as the welfare-state and social security, long term employment relations and an accumula-52
tion process led by domestic mass consumption. Neoliberalism is characterized by the progressive53
dismantling and replacement of the welfare by a market regulator state, the flexibilization of em-54
ployment relations and liberalization of goods, services and financial flows and the rise of finance55
as a dominating sector of the economy and of financial motives as the leading principle of non-56
financial corporate governance (Boyer, 2015; Duménil and Lévy, 2014; Harvey, 2014; Husson,57
2012; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).58
Fordism and Neoliberalism also translate into biophysical terms. In high income countries,59
fordism can be characterized as an extensive energy regime with decreasing e ciency but fastly60
increasing quantity integrated into the production process and supporting high labour produc-61
tivity gains. Neoliberalism exhibits a rising energy e ciency with a strong relocation of energy62
use abroad accompanying the restoration of the capital share in the distribution of value added.63
Beyond energy, correspondence between the socio-metabolic and accumulation regimes of French64
capitalism in the post-war era has been shown for production-based material flows (Cahen-Fourot65
and Durand, 2016; Magalhães et al., 2019).66
This paper pertains to a research program in its infancy and is thus mainly descriptive.67
Still, our research question is twofold. First, it is to confirm the common temporality between68
accumulation and socio-metabolic regimes of French capitalism in the post-war period by go-69
ing beyond methodological nationalism through integrating material footprint data (Wiedmann70
et al., 2015). Second, it is to discuss the dialectical relation between accumulation and socio-71
metabolic regimes to understand the interdependencies and mutual influences that may explain72
their common dynamics.73
In the reminder of this paper, we first provide in section 2 a short methodological introduction74
to MFA. We then present data to characterize the fordist and neoliberal socio-metabolic regimes75
and to approach the internationalization of French capitalism in a physical perspective. In section76
3, we draw from this new perspective on internationalization and discuss accumulation regimes77
and the shift from Fordism to Neoliberalism. In section 4, we investigate possible causalities78
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relating accumulation and socio-metabolic regimes in discussing the role of material in economic79
and political processes. We conclude by pointing out some limits and perspectives of this work.80
2 Fordist and neoliberal socio-metabolic regimes: from an81
extensive domestic to an extensive o shore materiality82
This section shows to what extent the shift between Fordism and Neoliberalism translates into83
material terms. We first recall the methodology of MFA and explain the need of the consumption-84
based approach. We then describe the main material flows tendencies. First, we examine absolute85
and relative material consumption at the aggregate level. Second, we deepen our description of86
socio-metabolic regimes by scrutinizing disaggregated data. Finally, we highlight the growing87
o shoring of material use.88
2.1 Material flow analysis: a methodological introduction89
MFA most often focuses on the domestic scale, for which long term statistics exist (Eurostat,90
2018). Common indicators are domestic extraction (DE), imports (I ), exports (E), physical91
trade balance (PTB = I - E) and the domestic material consumption (DMC = DE + PTB).92
The material intensity (MI ) of an economy corresponds to the DMC-to-GDP ratio (see table 1).93
It is worth recalling that DMC adds flows of a very di erent nature: domestic extraction refers to94
raw materials whereas trade flows are a mix of raw and manufactured commodities. Some (low-95
income) extractive countries have therefore a much higher DMC per capita than high income96
countries. For instance, this can lead to the (wrong) conclusion that Chile consumes three times97
more material per capita than France or Germany1. DMC is generally the main indicator to98
assess national material dynamics. Many industrialized countries have instituted policies (Giljum99
et al., 2015; OECD, 2019; Wiedmann et al., 2015) encouraging ‘dematerialization’ by setting100
decreasing material intensity targets (e.g until recently MI was considered a key indicator of101
the EU sustainable development and Europe 2020 strategies). However, DMC’s methodological102
nationalism entails blindness to indirect material flows generated abroad to satisfy a country’s103
final demand.104
Indirect flows are relevant measures of environmental load displacement because they re-105
main in the exporting country but are necessary for the provision of exports (Dittrich et al.,106
2012). Since production and consumption in high income countries are increasingly dependent107
on material and energy resources from other world regions2, environmental impacts have been108
1Respectively around 43t/cap and 14t/cap in 2009 (Giljum et al., 2014, Table 1). Chile provides an interesting
example as the leading world copper supplier: “each ton exported by Chile needs around 25 tonnes of indirect
flows that remain in the country in the form of waste and emissions” (Muñoz et al., 2009, p. 888).
2Between 1990 and 2005, world trade volumes in products increased by 5.8% annually, while production
only grew by 2.5% per year. Growth in trade was the highest for manufactured products (6.4%), followed by
agricultural products (3.8%) and fuels and mineral products (3.5%) (Giljum et al., 2015).
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increasingly approached through the whole ecological cost — the footprint — of material use109
and greenhouse gases emissions (Peters, 2008; Wiedmann et al., 2006).110
The fundamental idea of the consumption-based approach is to allocate all the environmental
responsibility to the final consumer. For material flows, this involves switching from DMC to
the material footprint (MF) to take into account the raw material equivalents (RMEs) — that is
not only materials actually contained in imports but also upstream material flows required along
the whole production chain. Material footprint is defined as (Wiedmann et al., 2015)
MF = DE +RTB
where RTB is the raw trade balance that is raw material equivalents of imports minus raw111
material equivalents of exports. It is important to note that the concept of RME refers only112
to “used materials” — that is, those material flows that enter economic processes. The other113
component of these indirect flows, so-called unused extraction3, is not included in RME and,114
despite its ecological relevance, is not considered here. Material inputs included in RME are115
therefore necessary to produce an output. A certain portion of such inputs, however, is embodied116
in the final outputs, whereas the rest of the material is dissipated along the production chain or117
recycled.118
The di erence between DMC and MF can be huge for metal-exporting countries (with MF119
< DMC) and high income industrialized countries (with MF > DMC; except for Australia).120
This change is particularly important for Europe, the region with the highest share of materials121
embodied in imports (Giljum et al., 2015). Bruckner et al. (2012, table 5) show that MF was122
49% higher than DMC in 2005 for France. A final motivation to adopt a material footprint123
perspective for France is the steep increase from 15% in 1948 to over 50% in 2015 of the amount124
of imports compared to domestic extraction (I/DE) (Magalhães et al., 2019).125
To estimate RME, it is necessary to trace material flows through the production system into126
domestic or foreign final consumption. Di erent methods exist to compute the material footprint127
of a country (Eurostat, 2015; Lutter et al., 2016). Multi-Regional Input Output (MRIO) models128
permit to study and quantify the dependency of countries regarding imports from other parts129
of the world (Giljum et al., 2015). Unfortunately, these data usually do not go back further130
than 1990. As for the bottom-up coe cient approach, it is inappropriate for our macroeconomic131
scale. Indeed, it is very hard to construct solid coe cients for a large number of especially132
highly processed products (Lutter et al., 2016), particularly for a long period. Moreover, we133
prefer not to implement a hybrid method (MRIO-coe cient approach) that bears the risk of134
being too opaque. Our production- and consumption-based historical time series combine the135
novel long term domestic material flow data for France from Magalhães et al. (2019) with data136
from the Eora input-output database (Lenzen et al., 2013). All details on data and time series137
3Upstream material flows associated with imports are called indirect flows. Hidden flows of domestic origin
are called domestic unused extraction. These flows are “soil and rock excavated during construction or overburden
from mining, the unused by-catch in fishery, the unused parts of the straw harvest in agriculture or natural gas
flared or vented at the extraction site” (Eurostat, 2018, p. 19).
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construction can be found in the appendix4. Table 1 sums up the main MFA concepts.138
acronym unit meaning / definition
DE t Domestic Extraction
PTB = I ≠ E t Physical Trade Balance
DMC = DE + PTB t Domestic Material Consumption
RMEimp t Raw Material Equivalent: Upstream material requirements of imports
RMEexp t Raw Material Equivalent: Upstream material requirements of exports
RTB = RMEimp ≠ RMEexp t Raw Trade Balance
MF = DE + RTB t Material Footprint (or Raw Material Consumption)
MI = DMC/GDP t per US$ Material Intensity: e ciency of material use
AMI = MF/GDP t per US$ Adjusted Material Intensity: e ciency of material use corrected for MF
MP = GDP/DMC US$ per t Material Productivity
Table 1: t = ton. Note that MF is also termed RMC (raw material consumption).
In what follows, we first describe material dynamics at the aggregate level, considering abso-139
lute material consumption and the material intensity of the gross value added (GVA)5. We then140
disaggregate into MFA’s four main categories: biomass, metal, non-metal and fossil fuel.141
2.2 An aggregate material view at French capitalism142
Figure 1 illustrates the aggregate material consumption of French capitalism since 1948. It is, to143
the best of our knowledge, the first long term comparison of material consumption in production-144
and consumption-based approaches for France.145
4While beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning the new approach suggested by Piñero et al.
(2019). They combine MFA and a global value chains (GVC) approach to allocate environmental responsibility
based on the value added each country and sector appropriate along the chain. An interesting result is that the
consumption-based responsibility is lower than the GVC-based one for Germany and France since 1990.
5Here we consider GVA at factors cost as it is more accurate to compare the distribution of value added
between labour and capital as we do in section 3. GVA at factors cost = compensation of employees + gross
operating surplus + other subsidies on production ≠ other taxes on production. Value added is thus comprehended
as the sum of payments to use primary inputs (e.g. labour and capital) (Miller and Blair, 2009).
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Figure 1: Domestic material consumption and material footprint in tonnes from 1948 to 2015.
Sources: Lenzen et al. (2012, 2013); Magalhães et al. (2019) and authors’ computations.
This figure indicates no dematerialization of French capitalism despite technological improve-146
ments and the shift of production toward services. It confirms that accumulation regimes as147
identified by RT have their counterpart in terms of socio-metabolic regimes6. We observe a clear148
break in the 1970s, as already observed by Wiedenhofer et al. (2013) and Cahen-Fourot and149
Durand (2016) for energy. The shift between Fordism and Neoliberalism in the 1970s appears as150
a stabilization of material consumption at the domestic scale and as an increasing o shoring as151
indicated by the footprint trajectory. Moreover, the divergence of the two curves that emerges152
in the mid-1960s highlights the importance of the footprint perspective. These curves follow a153
very similar path up until the end of the 1960s and shift apart at the onset of the globaliza-154
tion era. Both curves exhibit an increasing trend up until the late 1970s. DMC then shows a155
fluctuating yet flat trend afterwards, whereas the MF curve keeps increasing (although slower).156
All series experience another shift in the years 2007-2009 at the outburst of the global financial157
and economic crisis. Trajectories did not then come back to their previous trends as the figure158
shows. As of today, it is still unclear whether this is due to evolutions in production processes159
and structures or to the ongoing consequences of the crisis7. MF grew 4-fold since 1948, from160
316 Mt8 to 1217 Mt in 2015 (the population then rose from 41.1 to 66.4 million), reaching a peak161
of 1420 Mt just before the financial crisis of 2008.162
6Initially three main socio-metabolic regimes were identified in human history: hunter-gatherers, agricultur-
alists, and industrial society (Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 1997). These longue durée regimes make sense from a
pure metabolic point of view but may hidden historical variations due to capitalist development. In this regard,
our paper can be seen as a deepening of the understanding of the quantitative and qualitative variations in the
industrial society socio-metabolic regime for France in the after-war period.
7Kovacic et al. (2018) show that no major change occurred in the use of energy in the decade following the
financial and economic crisis. Using a structural measure of inter-sectoral dependencies, Cahen-Fourot et al.
(2020) also show the key importance of natural resources and raw materials for 18 European countries in 2010.
8One megatonne (Mt)=106 tonnes (t).
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Figure 2: Domestic and footprint adjusted material intensity of GVA at factors cost in kilo per
2010 euro. Sources: authors’ computations from Lenzen et al. (2012, 2013); Magalhães et al.
(2019) and OECDStat data.
At the aggregate level, one can observe in figure 2 a long term relative decoupling for both163
approaches: a decrease of MI from 1958 onwards and of AMI from 1973 onwards. RT periodiza-164
tion in terms of Fordism and Neoliberalism corresponds to both MF and AMI trajectories at the165
aggregate level.166
2.3 A disaggregate material view at French capitalism167
The disaggregate level reveals more diverse dynamics. As can be seen on figure 3, the shift in the168
absolute material trajectory of French capitalism between Fordism and Neoliberalism translates169
into the disaggregated material categories for DMC but less so when looked at through MF.170
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Figure 3: DMC and MF for biomass, metal, non-metal and fossil fuel. All data are in tonnes
from 1948 to 2015. Sources: authors’ computations from Lenzen et al. (2012, 2013); Magalhães
et al. (2019).
In the DMC perspective, we observe clear shifting trends for all curves in the mid- and late-171
1970s. Biomass continuously increases since 1948 but with a much flatter shape after the twilight172
of Fordism in the late 1960s. Non-metallic minerals acknowledge the strongest increase, with an173
average annual growth of 8.7% for 25 years (table 2). Metal consumption stops increasing and174
experiences a continuous decrease since the end of Fordism while non-metal consumption strongly175
oscillates but does not exhibit an increasing trend after Fordism. Fossil fuel consumption reaches176
a maximum in 1980, after the second oil crisis, then sharply decreases and remains stable for 20177
years. The fossil fuel DMC has decreased further after the 2008 crisis.178
MF o ers a slightly di erent picture. Biomass and metal continuously increase, respectively179
from 1948 and the early 1960s, indicating no shift between Fordism and Neoliberalism. Contrari-180
wise, non-metal and fossil fuel footprints indicate again a break in the mid-1970s. Their behavior181
is similar to their domestic trajectory9, although for fossil fuels the level is substantially higher182
than domestic consumption (the energy embodied in imported goods is thus very high). Note183
also that the increase in fossil fuel consumption goes with a strong decrease in coal extraction184
from the early 1960s (oil become dominant in the energy mix around 1963).185
Metal MF shows important oscillations during Fordism (due to a change in the statistical ter-186
ritory and estimation issues) but still remains below DMC. It then always exceeds DMC for the187
neoliberal period (from 1976). This category perfectly illustrates the need of the consumption-188
based approach: MF never stops rising whereas the DMC curve decreases (domestic metal extrac-189
tion strongly decreases in the 1970s). Taking waste from metal processing abroad into account,190
there is no dematerialization concerning this category in France (metal footprint exhibits a con-191
9The use of metal ores and fossil fuels is usually well explained by the GDP per capita (Wiedmann et al.,
2015, Table 1).
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stant rise since 1965). The transition in accumulation regimes nearly coincides with the shift192
from net exporter to net importer of metal (in 1978) and with the crossing of the two curves.193
Table 2 also underlines the specificity of this category: all materials but metal indicate a relative194
decoupling trajectory during Neoliberalism.195
Non-metal MF — the most important category in weight — is close to non-metal DMC.196
Indeed, these materials are abundant and their extraction unit cost is low. Transportation costs197
are therefore relatively high in comparison and trade flows are limited10. Due to their properties198
and to political and ecological issues, some flows are thus more concerned by globalization than199
others. O shoring of metallic goods and substitution of imported oil for domestic coal is pos-200
sible but o shoring of construction materials — which compose much of non-metals — is more201
complicated. Stabilization of both curves can be understood as a saturation of accumulated202
material stocks (buildings, roads, etc.). Global in-use stocks of manufactured capital already203
require about half of global material flows for their expansion and maintenance (Krausmann204
et al., 2017; Wiedenhofer et al., 2015). There is thus an unavoidable material path dependency205
between socio-metabolic regimes induced by in-use material stocks (Pauliuk and Müller, 2014;206
Wiedenhofer et al., 2019). Interestingly, the material infrastructure of Neoliberalism rests on,207
and extends, that of Fordism.208
Moreover, not only can the shift from a socio-metabolic regime to another be detected in the209
dynamics of a series itself but it can also be in the growing di erence between DMC and MF210
series. In that regard, we can see a socio-metabolic shift even for categories whose series exhibit211
a continuity in their own dynamics, e.g. biomass and metal11. In a nutshell, the overall corre-212
spondence between socio-metabolic and accumulation regimes is remarkable even if unsurprising213
and was yet to be investigated in details for France.214
Figures 1 and 2 and table 2 indicate that Fordism is an extensive socio-metabolic regime215
at both domestic and footprint levels. It is characterized by a high annual average growth of216
material consumption and a low degrowth of domestic material intensity and low growth of the217
adjusted material intensity. Neoliberalism is an intensive socio-metabolic regime at the domestic218
level with an annual average degrowth of material consumption and a significant annual average219
degrowth of material intensity. At the footprint level, it is rather a weakly extensive regime with a220
low average annual growth of material footprint and a significant average annual degrowth of the221
adjuted material intensity, albeit lower than at the domestic level. These results are consistent222
with the characterization of Fordism and Neoliberalism in terms of their social relation to energy223
as shown by Cahen-Fourot and Durand (2016).224
10According to the data from Magalhães et al. (2019), non-metallic minerals consist of less than 20% of France’s
trade flows and concern mainly Germany and Belgium.
11In statistical terms, it is unsure whether a structural break analysis would yield any significant result for,
e.g., biomass footprint. However, a structural break would probably be detected in the cointegration relationship
between biomass DMC and MF, with cointegration turning insignificant after the late 1960s due to a non-trend
stationary di erence between biomass DMC and MF.
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Material consumption 1948-1973 1974-2015 Material intensity 1950-1973 1974-2015
DMC 4.2% -0.4% MI -0.8% -2.2%
Biomass_dmc 1.3% 0.2% Biomass_mi -3.5% -1.6%
Metal_dmc 3.9% -1.9% Metal_mi -0.8% -3.6%
Non-metal_dmc 8.7% -0.4% Non-metal_mi 2.8% -2.1%
Fossil_dmc 4.2% -1.0% Fossil_mi -0.6% -2.7%
MF 5.3% 0.1% AMI 0.4% -1.7%
Biomass_foot 3.0% 0.6% Biomass_ami -2.5% -1.2%
Metal_foot 2.7% 1.9% Metal_ami 11.6% 0.1%
Non-metal_foot 8.3% 0.2% Non-metal_ami 2.7% -1.5%
Fossil_foot 5.9% -0.7% Fossil_ami 1.6% -2.5%
Table 2: Annual average growth rate of material consumption and of material intensity of gross
value added during Fordism and Neoliberalism. Source: authors calculations from Magalhães
et al. (2019) data.
2.4 A growing o shoring of material use225
The diverging trajectories of DMC andMF o er a material perspective on the internationalization226
of French capitalism. Examining the physical and the raw material trade balances (PTB and227
RTB; presented as imports ≠ exports) substantiates this perspective. As explained before, PTB228
is the physical equivalent of the monetary trade balance, whereas RTB includes both direct and229
indirect flows (i.e. it includes also all materials that are not directly composing net imports but230
were necessary to their production).231
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the total and non-fossil fuels (non-FF) PTB since 1948. We232
see the huge importance of fossil fuels-related materials in France’s net imports as France is a233
net importer in physical terms on the entire period when fossils are considered. The deepening234
integration of the French economy in the global economy is perhaps better captured if only non-235
fossil fuel materials are considered: We observe a continuous rise in net imports from the early236
1970s onwards. France becomes a net importer in 1994.237
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Figure 4: PTB and non-fossil fuels (non-FF) PTB of France from 1948 to 2015, presented as net
imports, in tonnes of materials. Source: Magalhães et al. (2019).
RTB (figure 5) corroborates this observation as net imports exhibit a continuous rise since238
the early 1960s when fossil fuels are included and since the late 1960s when only non-fossil fuels239
materials are considered. Similarly, after a decade of roughly balanced trade (total RTB) and240
excess trade (non-FF RTB), France becomes net importer of materials respectively in the early241
1960s and late 1970s.242
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Figure 5: RTB and non-FF RTB of France from 1948 to 2015, in tonnes of materials, presented
as net imports. RTB includes both direct and indirect material flows embodied in trade. Source:
Magalhães et al. (2019) and authors calculations.
The di erence between RTB and PTB is an indicator of the dependency of French capitalism243
on indirect material flows from trade. Figure 6 presents the rising divergence between RTB244
11
and PTB (by construction equal to MF ≠ DMC). After a fast increase in the end of Fordism245
(1963–1974), the curve slowly and steadily increases, reaching a peak in 2009.246
-70 000 000
30 000 000
130 000 000
230 000 000
330 000 000
430 000 000
530 000 000
194
8
195
2
195
6
196
0
196
4
196
8
197
2
197
6
198
0
198
4
198
8
199
2
199
6
200
0
200
4
200
8
201
2
ton
ne
s
Total RTB-PTB 0-line Non-FF RTB-PTB
Figure 6: Total and non-FF indirect material flows due to trade (RTB ≠PTB =MF ≠DMC)
at the aggregate level. Source: Magalhães et al. (2019) and authors calculations.
Figure 7 further shows the constantly rising dependency of French capitalism to the global247
economy as measured through the ratio of DMC and MF to DE, indicating how much of material248
use is covered by domestic extraction: the MF/DE ratio reached nearly 2 in the last decade,249
whereas the DMC/DE ratio does not exceed 1.3. In the 2010s, half of the total physical basis250
of French capitalism came from abroad. This is more than many industrialized countries but251
still less than high income countries with limited resources such as Netherlands or Switzerland252
(Bruckner et al., 2012).253
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Figure 7: Domestic material consumption to domestic extraction and material footprint to do-
mestic extraction ratios.
We can conclude that the fordist and neoliberal socio-metabolic regimes are of an extensive254
nature beyond the domestic scale. The dynamics of PTB and RTB indicate that methodological255
nationalism o ers a limited perspective to assert the socio-metabolic regime of a country. In the256
historical context of globalization, the footprint approach using consumption-based time series257
brings relevant insights.258
3 From Fordism to Neoliberalism: the o shoring-financialization259
nexus of French capitalism260
This section integrates the o shoring of material use to regulationnist explanations of the end of261
Fordism. Interestingly, the transition from Fordism to Neoliberalism is clearer in physical than262
in monetary terms. We further provide stylized facts characterizing the financialization of French263
capitalism. We argue that this process combined with o shoring has reinforced and consolidated264
the physical dependency of French capitalism to the rest of the world. We therefore illustrate265
how RT and MFA combine with each other: The growing o shoring of material use highlights a266
deeper internationalization of French capitalism and the crisis of Fordism. The financialization267
of French capitalism and its systemic complementarity with the o shoring process can explain268
the continuous growth of trade flows.269
Figure 8 shows the contrast between the material and monetary perspectives. Whereas the270
monetary trade balance oscillated during Fordism, material imports increased rapidly. From the271
end of Fordism until 2000, France imported huge quantities of material while in monetary terms272
exports were greater than imports12. France’s monetary trade balance — which had been in273
large surplus until 1976 for common consumer goods — turned to deficit from 2000, especially274
12This is a typical case of ecologically unequal exchange with the rest of the world (Hornborg, 2012).
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for intermediate goods (automotive, electronics, transport equipment etc.), which had hitherto275
driven exports. From 2003, the trade balance became structurally negative following increasing276
imports of intermediate and consumer goods and of energy products whose prices literally soared277
from 2002 to 2007.278
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Figure 8: PTB and RTB as net imports are in tonnes (left axis), the monetary trade balance is
expressed as net imports in millions of 2010 euro (right axis). Sources: authors’ computations
and OECDStat.
Increasing imports of intermediate goods are an indication of o shoring (Feenstra and Han-279
son, 1999; Feenstra and Jensen, 2012). Figure 9 shows the long run o shoring dynamics of280
French capitalism since 1970 through the share of imported intermediate consumption in to-281
tal intermediate use of domestic industries. We complement this indicator with the share of282
imported products in total final demand.283
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Figure 9: Share of imported intermediate consumption (IC) in total intermediate consumption
and share of imported products in final demand (FD). Source: authors’ computations with
data from Eora 199.82 Input-Output database. Shares with data at basic prices are exhibited
but results with data at purchaser prices indicated very similar trends and shares of the same
magnitude (slightly lower).
The increasing internationalization of French capitalism as illustrated on figures 4-9 is identi-284
fied by RT as one of the main cause of Fordism’s crisis from the mid-1970s. After infrastructures285
and capital stocks in key sectors were reconstituted, the domestic market alone became insuf-286
ficient to support high returns to scale, as shown by slowing productivity gains from the mid-287
1960s/early-1970s onwards. Exports then appeared as a mean to sustain the accumulation regime288
based on increasing returns. The average annual growth rate between 1960 and 1968 is 11% for289
imports and 7.8% for exports (Balladur, 1972, p. 13). Therefore, internationalization in the290
1960s initially opened up new growth opportunities and exports complemented domestic wages291
in the composition of e ective demand steering the accumulation regime. However, the increasing292
importance of exports relatively to wages for steering growth turned price-competitiveness into293
a major concern of exporting firms (Boyer, 2015; Loiseau et al., 1977; Vidal, 2003). Guillaumet294
(2002) finds that, between 1850 and 2000, trade had a positive e ect on growth only between295
1957 and 1974. The productivity gains-wages increases-domestic mass consumption loop under-296
lying the fordist social compromise was then broken and domestic wages became an adjustment297
variable. All the more so after the collapse of Bretton Woods and the emergence of the European298
monetary integration from 1972 onwards, with gradual constraints on exchange rates.299
Alongside the rise of international trade, finance-led capitalism started to emerge through300
liberalization of international financial flows and the financialization of high income capitalisms.301
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French capitalism experienced concomitant internationalization — first through the growing302
importance of trade, then through the o shoring of production and integration into global value303
chains — and deep transformation in its financial structure (Morin, 2000).304
The systemic complementarity between financialization and o shoring has thus been instru-305
mental in producing a new accumulation regime, together with the emergence of a new mode306
of regulation that involves deep transformations in the wage-labour nexus13. The growth of the307
invisible trade flows from the 1970s (figures 4-7) is a consequence of this macroeconomic process.308
The evolution of the distribution of GVA of non-financial corporations in France substantiates309
this comprehension. We approach financialization through the evolution of the wage and the310
profit shares in GVA and through financial accumulation.311
We look at the non-financial corporations (NFCs). Indeed, we assume NFCs to be the main312
users of materials through intermediate consumption (between 1950 and 2015, the share of NFCs313
in total intermediate consumption in monetary terms oscillates between 74 and 83 %, with an314
increasing trend since 199714). Four stylized facts characterize the financialization of French315
NFCs as shown on figure 10.316
13This institutional form began shifting towards capital in labour-capital relations. The other key institutional
forms of RT’s framework include: the monetary regime, the forms of competition, the form of the state, and
the insertion into the international regime. Needless to say, they also underwent transformations in the shift
from Fordism to Neoliberalism. A sixth one is currently being discussed: the social relation to the environment
Cahen-Fourot (2020).
14Authors’ calculations from OECDStat national accounting data.
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Figure 10: Wage share (compensation of employees / GVA), margin rate (gross operating surplus
/ GVA), investment rate (GFCF / GVA), capital returns and financial assets of non-financial
corporations, 1950-2015. Capital returns paid and received are the sum of, respectively, paid and
received distributed income of corporation (mainly dividends) and interests. Source: Authors’
calculations from OECDStat data.
The wage share exhibited a slow increase during most of Fordism then increased more in late317
Fordism and decreased after the oil shocks period, stabilizing during Neoliberalism at a level318
lower than during Fordism. Symmetrically, the margin rate experienced a decrease from 1950 to319
the early 1980s, followed by an increase afterwards until the end of the 1980s, then stabilizing320
at the early Fordism level. The strongest increase in the margin rate is observed at the onset of321
neoliberal capitalism. What was lost in profit share during Fordism is regained in less than ten322
years.323
Second, we observe a decoupling of the margin and gross fixed capital formation rates. From324
1980 onwards, the close correlation between the two series is broken and they increasingly diverge.325
The investment rate oscillates at a level appreciably lower than during the core of the fordist era326
and does not follow the increase in the profit share. In line with most studies of financialization,327
this indicates that the increase in the profit share does not fuel investment in productive capital328
domestically.329
Third, an increasing share of GVA went back to financial capital, in the form of interests and330
dividends (added together as capital returns on figure 10), which form the distributed profit15.331
15This trend would be even stronger if stocks buybacks, a major feature of the shareholder value maximization
orientation (Auvray and Rabinovich, 2019), were taken into account.
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Capital returns paid continuously increased from the late 1960s to 2008, followed by capital332
returns received. After the early 1990s, the capital returns paid net of capital returns received333
decrease as NFCs’ financial income gets closer to their distributed profit. This highlight the334
importance of considering gross as much as net flows. It should not be interpreted as a process of335
decreasing financialization but rather as another dimension of financialization: Financial income336
becomes increasingly important for NFCs, which behave more and more like financial investors337
rather than as producers. This increasing trend exemplifies the shift in corporate strategies338
from “retain and reinvest” to “downsize and distribute” corporate governance (Lazonick and339
O’Sullivan, 2000).340
Fourth, this observation is further substantiated by the accumulation of financial assets,341
whose proportion as compared to fixed assets exhibited a rising trend with important fluctuations342
during the internet bubble and the subprimes crises. This process of financial accumulation is343
a well-known stylized fact in the literature on financialization (Krippner, 2005; Stockhammer,344
2004). Unfortunately, the data on financial assets are only available from 1995 onwards, which345
limit our historical hindsight. The data nonetheless indicates an increasing financial capital346
accumulation as compared to productive capital accumulation. Kovacic et al. (2018) refer to this347
as an increasing financial intensity when looking at the financial assets / value added ratio16. Of348
course, financial assets prices tend to inflate while non-financial assets can depreciate, especially349
fixed assets (e.g. productive capital). The evolution of these latter ratios can then be partly350
attributed to the appreciation of financial assets prices. This still shows a financial accumulation351
in the form of capital gains. Interestingly, however, the evolution is much less clear when non-352
produced non-financial assets are also considered.353
Financialization is deeply linked to the reorganization of production along global value chains354
and to the restructuring of production in high income countries (Ivanova, 2019). The decrease355
in production costs enabled by globalization allowed parent firms controlling global value chains356
to maintain or increase margin rates in a context of price stagnation in their domestic markets.357
Conversely, shareholders seeking short term returns and managers incentivized by non-wage in-358
come like stock-options led firms to enter into active cost-reduction strategies, especially through359
spread production along global value chains. Conflictuality in capital-labor relations increased:360
Capital owners and managers gained new avenues for leverage over weakening labor unions and361
workers taking part in a global labour market (Freeman, 2007) with uneven environmental, wage362
and labor standards. Together with the decline of industry and the rise of unemployment in their363
home countries, costs-reduction strategies led to a reduced need for reinvesting profits. They were364
available for financial accumulation and shareholder value maximization through dividends and365
stock buybacks. The o shoring-financialization nexus can therefore be comprehended together366
as forming a successful attempt at restoring the profit share after the fordist era of increasing367
wages and intensive productive investment in high income countries (Auvray and Rabinovich,368
16We prefer to look at the financial assets relatively to non-financial and fixed assets as it is a comparison
between stocks rather than between a stock — the financial assets at time t and a flow — the value added at
time t.
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2019; Durand and Miroudot, 2015; Fiebiger, 2016; Ivanova, 2019; Milberg, 2008; Milberg and369
Winkler, 2010).370
4 The dialectics between socio-metabolic and accumula-371
tion regimes: a tentative discussion372
These observations remain descriptive and shed little light on the causal mechanisms linking373
socio-metabolic and accumulation regimes. RT prioritized endogenous factors that initially en-374
sured Fordism’s success in its analysis of the crisis (Lordon, 2002). Therefore, RT did not375
integrate material flows for they were considered exogenous factors, e.g. oil17. This epistemolog-376
ical stance entailed blindness to the role of materials in supporting accumulation regimes and in377
shaping institutional compromises of the mode of regulation.378
In what follows, we attempt at contributing to remedy this incompleteness. We discuss how379
cheap and abundant oil allowed for the high productivity gains and mass consumption norms380
at the basis of the fordist social compromise and how materials may be instrumental in shaping381
modes of regulation.382
4.1 Power of matter: The economic role of materials in underlying383
accumulation regimes384
As we recalled in section 3, productivity gains were the cornerstone of the fordist social com-385
promise through supporting a “virtuous circle” of mass production, mass consumption and high386
growth accompanied by wage increases, long term employment relations and strong redistribu-387
tion mechanisms. The high productivity gains of the fordist era did not come out of the blue:388
Cheap and abundant oil was key in enabling them (Cahen-Fourot and Durand, 2016). This is in389
particular true for agriculture and industry.390
Agriculture experienced the most dramatic changes during Fordism. In 1945, more than 7.5391
million people — over a third of the working population — worked in this sector and the country392
had di culty feeding the population (ration stamps were maintained until 1949). Successive393
governments encouraged a strong recovery in production, which required an improvement in394
productivity. This was possible through cheap oil imports that allowed for strong mechanization395
and massive use of fossil-based inputs, e.g. fertilizers. As a consequence, from 1950 to 1974,396
the agricultural population decreased from 29% to 10% of the total working population (Allaire,397
1988). Agriculture lost an average of 135 000 jobs per year between 1944 and 1973.398
Intensification of agriculture and the increase in biomass production enabled by oil were key399
in the internationalization that complemented domestic demand in supporting the fordist social400
17According to Huber (2013, p. 178), Aglietta had recognized the significance of energy to the emerging US
fordist mode of mass production in his book of 1979: “A condition of its success was a revolution in energy which
generalized the industrial use of electricity and made possible the construction of high capacity motors which
enormously increased the power available to industry.”
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compromise until the beginning of the 1970s. Agricultural exports enabled the trade balance401
to be in equilibrium between 1960 and 1968 together with the automotive industry. In the late402
1960s, exports growth was mainly due to exceptionally high exports of agricultural products while403
growth in exports of industrial products had slowed down (Balladur, 1972; de Ravignan, 1980).404
The orientation of agriculture towards exports and its specialization steered high productivity405
gains that freed up labour absorbed by the industrial sector. Material intensive industries, e.g.406
mining, metallurgy and the automotive industry, applying taylorist techniques, steered high407
productivity gains in the manufacturing sector that formed the backbone of the fordist social408
compromise. Automotive industry’s exports were largely in surplus and amounted for most of409
the trade surplus for the period 1959-1973 (Mistral, 1975).410
Nonetheless, mass production alone is not su cient to stabilize an accumulation regime.411
A key feature of an accumulation regime is the correspondence between production and the412
social demand. Mass production had mass consumption as a counterpart, which allowed for the413
“virtuous circle” of Fordism. Fordist mass consumption norms were also shaped by fossil fuels.414
The centrality of oil to postwar mass consumption was both direct and indirect. Not only was it415
the material basis entering countless products (e.g. plastics, clothing, medicine). Its centrality as416
transportation fuel ensured that even if products were not made with petroleum products, they417
were distributed and consumed via petroleum-based modes of mobility (Huber, 2013). Oil was418
key on both sides — production and consumption —, steering the use and production of other419
materials, e.g. biomass and metals. Through supporting the advent of mass production and mass420
consumption, materials were thus instrumental in the increase of living standards and upward421
social mobility of the fordist era in France, which generated a high level of social consensus422
(Brand and Wissen, 2013).423
The transition to the more intensive neoliberal accumulation and socio-metabolic regime has424
in no way meant a rupture with the extensive and fossilist fordist regime. This is especially true425
for themode of living, that is the “dominant patterns of production, distribution, and consumption426
that are deeply rooted in the everyday practices of the upper and middle classes of the global427
North and increasingly in the emerging countries of the global South” (Brand and Wissen, 2012,428
p. 548). Rather, the more domestic materiality of French capitalism inherited from Fordism is429
partly substituted for and partly complemented by the more o shore materiality of the neoliberal430
accumulation regime. Therefore, in terms of socio-metabolic evolution, it seems more relevant431
to speak of a metabolic addition than of a metabolic transition between the two regimes18.432
Interestingly, in the US case, high productivity gains created stronger pressures for an equally433
energy-intensive geography of consumption. The persistence of “petro-capitalism” is mainly due434
to the wider embeddedness of oil-dependent consumption norms (Huber, 2013). This is also435
valid for France, though without domestic mass production. Financialization, through reinforcing436
o shoring, is enabling to maintain an “imperial mode of living” that is the patterns of production437
18This is coherent with scholarship in environmental history showing that there was never a global energy
transition in history but merely energy additions to the pre-existing energy mix (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016).
This is also consistent with the longue durée socio-metabolic regimes mentioned in footnote 6.
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and consumption that disproportionately rely on global labour power, resources and sinks (Brand438
and Wissen, 2013).439
4.2 Matter of power: The political role of materials in shaping modes440
of regulation441
Despite their role in sustaining the fordist social compromise, materials had ambiguous e ects on442
the institutionalized compromises regulating the accumulation regime. To some extent, materials443
were therefore also instrumental in the shift towards Neoliberalism (Cahen-Fourot and Durand,444
2016; Debeir et al., 2013; Huber, 2013; Mitchell, 2011).445
Workers’ ability to control the production and distribution of key material flows were crucial446
in the advancement of socio-political rights and in the emergence of welfare states in some447
western countries. Coal exploitation was highly labour intensive and allowed workers to push448
their agenda, especially in the UK and France. First, coal extraction required high concentration449
of workers, which made mass social movements and the emergence of organized labour easier.450
Second, they had the expertise as they worked autonomously deep underearth. Third, coal was451
distributed by railroads, which enabled railways workers to block its distribution and hence the452
source of energy of the economy. In other terms, through the characteristics of its exploitation,453
coal fostered workers’ structural and associational powers. The first results from a strategic454
location in the supply chain while the second results from the collective organization of workers.455
These three features of coal exploitation therefore gave bargaining power to workers and proved456
instrumental in the emergence of the French welfare state (Debeir et al., 2013; Mitchell, 2011;457
Wright, 2000). The latter was to be at the core of the fordist accumulation regime: without the458
enactment of collective agreements and social security, mass consumption could not have been459
deployed as a necessary counterpart to mass production.460
Coal mines were nationalized in 1946 (creation of the public establishment Charbonnages de461
France) and coal production was made a national priority (noticeable in the first French Plans).462
Though decreasing, coal still dominated the energy mix until 1963. In 1958, France produced 59463
Mt of coal and the country had about 145 000 miners. The transition from coal to oil — from464
a domestic material to an imported commodity — clearly impacted the fordist regime. The low465
price of oil implied overproduction of coal in the late 1950s. This resulted in the Jeanneney Plan466
(1959) that explicitly decided to decrease coal production and to reduce the workforce in this467
sector by closing several coal mines and investing in new oil refineries. In 1962, only two years468
after the Plan was launched, coal production declined to 52 Mt and the workforce to 120 000.469
The addition of oil to the energy mix and its progressive emergence as the main energy470
carrier had ambiguous e ects on the mode of regulation. In contrast to coal, oil extraction471
and distribution are not labour intensive and oil was mainly imported. The peculiarities of oil472
exploitation decreased the energy workers’ power to push further socio-political demands. There473
is thus an oil paradox: While cheap and abundant oil enabled the productivity gains providing474
the foundations of the fordist social compromise, it shifted the power balance between labour475
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and capital, thus laying the ground for the mutation of the wage-labour nexus that had been at476
the core of Fordism (Cahen-Fourot and Durand, 2016; Mitchell, 2011).477
Beyond coal and oil, material intensive industries also conferred strong structural and asso-478
ciational powers upon workers (Silver, 2003; Tronti, 1977; Wright, 2000). In the 1960s, France479
ranked fourth among European steel producers with approximately 20 Mt. There were more480
than 100 000 workers in the steel sector in the Lorraine region alone, whereas there are less than481
8000 nowadays (Raggi, 2013). The harmful nature of the work and the high costs of extraction482
lead to substituting imports to domestic production. The decline began in the 1960s with steel483
from Lorraine losing attractiveness because of imported minerals exhibiting cheaper cost and484
higher concentration in iron, up to 50-60%. Globalization made price competitiveness key and485
signalled the shift in French capitalism internationalization from exports complementing domes-486
tic demand to o shoring of heavy industries’ production. In the aftermath of Fordism, heavy487
industries concentrating unionized workers and materials were relocated to a great extent. The488
end of coal and iron ore mining undoubtedly weakened workers. Together with oil, it paved the489
way for the transformation of the wage-labour nexus and the challenging of the fordist social490
compromise that would result in the advent of a new mode of regulation supporting the neoliberal491
accumulation regime.492
As mediating tools in the labour-capital relation, materials are instrumental in shaping insti-493
tutionalised compromises emerging from social struggles and in enabling transformations in the494
modes of regulation supporting accumulation regimes. Drawing from Cahen-Fourot and Durand495
(2016), we suggest that the o shoring-financialization nexus a ected the mediating role of mate-496
rials in the labour-capital relation through triggering the relocation of key material flows abroad.497
Our hypothesis is that the o shoring-financialization nexus reduced the power of French workers498
to push their socio-political agenda in decreasing their ability to control the use, production and499
distribution of key material flows. In a self-reinforcing loop, this loss in structural and associa-500
tional powers — exemplified by the decrease in the wage share and in the unionization rate, that501
went from 30% in 1949 to 17-20% between 1960 and 1975 and then to around 11% in 201619 —502
may have in turn a ected the ability of workers to oppose the process of financialization and the503
o shoring of industries20.504
Although this paper does not attempt at properly testing this hypothesis, table 3 gives505
indications regarding the direction of the relation between the key series we presented. Most506
notably, the wage share is significantly negatively correlated with several variables highlighting507
the o shoring-financialization nexus such as capital returns paid and received by NFCs, the shares508
of imported intermediate consumption in total intermediate consumption and imported goods509
in final demand and with the non-fossil raw trade balance. Other variables exhibit very high510
19According to the long time series on unionization from the French ministry of labour, https://dares.
travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/xlsx/taux_syndicalisation_2016_5oct2018.xlsx, accessed February 25th, 2020.
20Another example of the persistence of deindustrialisation is the textile industry that lost two thirds of its
jobs and half of its production in the last twenty years. France now imports massive quantities of shoes and
wearings and exports luxury products or high value added commodities. The report is available here: https:
//www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3632345
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significant correlations between each other, illustrating the systemic complementarity between511
financialization and o shoring and their close relation with the relocation of material flows.512
Pearson pair-
wise correla-
tions
Wage
share
Capital
returns
paid
Capital
returns
received
Imported
IC in
total IC
Imported
goods
in final
demand
Total
RTB
Non-
fossil
RTB
DMC/DE MF/DE
Wage share — -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.27*** -0.33*** -0.28**
Capital returns
paid
-0.33*** — 0.97*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.82*** 0.87***
Capital returns
received
-0.33*** 0.97*** — 0.89*** 0.91*** 0.78*** 0.94** 0.76*** 0.81***
Imported IC in
total IC
-0.27*** 0.86*** 0.89*** — 0.99*** 0.85*** 0.89*** 0.81*** 0.86***
Imported goods
in final demand
-0.33*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.99*** — 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.83*** 0.87***
Total RTB 0.88*** 0.78*** 0.85*** 0.87*** — 0.92*** 0.98*** 0.98***
Non-fossil RTB -0.28** 0.95*** 0.94** 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.92*** — 0.85*** 0.95***
DMC/DE 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.98*** 0.85*** — 0.97***
MF/DE 0.87*** 0.81*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.97*** —
Table 3: Pearson pairwise correlations between the wage share, capital returns paid and received,
imported intermediate consumption in total intermediate consumption, imported goods in final
demand, total raw trade balance, non-fossil fuels raw trade balance, DMC to DE and MF to DE
ratios. Cells left blank are non-significant correlations. Significance threshold set up at 10% with
1% (***) and 5% (**).
We argue, therefore, that accumulation and socio-metabolic regimes combine with each other513
and are both the product of a given mode of regulation whose evolution is in turn partly shaped514
by accumulation and material flows dynamics.515
5 Conclusion516
This paper aims at bringing together MFA and RT to provide a descriptive picture of French517
capitalism since 1948 in some of its physical and socio-economic dimensions. We first show518
that the fordist and neoliberal accumulation regimes translate into socio-metabolic regimes. The519
fordist accumulation regime is an extensive socio-metabolic regime at both domestic and footprint520
levels. The neoliberal accumulation regime translates into an intensive socio-metabolic regime at521
the domestic level and into a weakly extensive one at the footprint level. Moreover, the shift from522
Fordism to Neoliberalism did not imply a change in the mode of living. The o shore materiality523
of Neoliberalism partly substituted for and partly complemented the more domestic materiality524
inherited from Fordism. In socio-metabolic terms, the shift of accumulation regime is thus an525
metabolic addition rather than a metabolic transition.526
Second, we attempt at linking the shift from Fordism to Neoliberalism and the o shoring-527
financialization nexus with the evolution of the material basis of French capitalism. We discuss528
tentatively how the o shoring of production and the financialization of French non-financial529
corporations, the disappearance of coal and the shrinking of heavy industries might have a ected530
the mediating role of materials in the labour-capital relation and the structural and associational531
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powers of workers. Fordism’s success was enabled by endogenous socio-economic factors — high532
productivity gains, domestic mass production and mass consumption, exports complementing533
domestic demand, strong redistribution mechanisms — that have their counterpart as a socio-534
metabolic regime in the form of material inputs. Fordism’s crisis came through these very same535
factors, with declining productivity gains combining with rising internationalization eventually536
turning into the o shoring-financialization nexus while French capitalism became increasingly537
dependent on imported material inputs.538
The paper’s contribution is therefore fourfold. It sets back the analysis of socio-metabolic539
regimes into the dynamics of capital accumulation. It shows — in the case of France — that it is540
accurate to historicize postwar socio-metabolic regimes in terms of Fordism and Neoliberalism.541
Building amongst others from energy history scholarship, a third contribution of this paper is to542
tackle how materials may be instrumental in the institutionalized compromises shaping modes of543
regulation, in particular the wage-labour nexus. Last but not least, the paper is the first attempt544
at cross-fertilizing RT and MFA. Environmental and material dynamics can no longer be ignored545
in the regulationnist framework while MFA — and Ecological Economics more generally — can546
no longer be largely disconnected from the structural evolutions of capitalism.547
Yet, our work is not exempt of methodological and theoretical limits. First, we neglect the548
waste and emissions part of socio-metabolic regimes. Second, MFA minimizes the importance549
of nuclear energy21 because it relies on ‘light’ non-renewable resources, e.g. uranium (Hecht,550
2014). The impact of the growth of nuclear energy on the wage-labour nexus and the transition551
from Fordism to Neoliberalism is unclear. Third, our estimate of the material footprint will be552
much improved once input-output tables prior to 1970 become available (Lenzen et al., 2013).553
Fourth, our hypothesis regarding the combined e ects of the o shoring-financialization nexus and554
of materials on the evolution of institutionalized compromises remain to be thoroughly tested.555
Fifth, the current paper merely insisted upon the wage-labour nexus but other institutional forms556
— the monetary regime, the form of the state, the form of competition, the insertion into the557
international regime and the social relation to the environment — were largely ignored.558
As one of the first of its kind, this paper calls for further development and opens up new559
research avenues. One is to understand the structural capitalist causes leading to building new560
infrastructures that create material path dependency (Chen and Graedel, 2015; Pauliuk and561
Müller, 2014; Wiedenhofer et al., 2019). Indeed, the measurement of in-use stocks and the562
role of infrastructures in accumulation regimes would be a crucial step to deepen the analysis.563
Another is to combine RT results with the valued added appropriation in global value chains564
perspective on environmental flows responsibility (Piñero et al., 2019) in a long term study. This565
would permit to complete our analysis at the sectoral level. In particular, the analysis of the566
construction sector is key to understand the materiality of Fordism and Neoliberalism. Third,567
taking into account the spatiality of financialization (French et al., 2011) could shed light on the568
expansion of the commodity frontier induced by the o shoring-financialization nexus. Fourth,569
21Nuclear energy allows France to save roughly 100 Mt of imported fossil fuel per year.
24
introducing the other institutional forms in the analysis would allow for a truly systemic account570
of the dynamics of capitalism in both its socio-economic and material dimensions.571
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1 Estimating the material footprint
We use the recent domestic material flow time series for France from Magalhães et al. (2019).
Data and indicators are presented for four main material groups: biomass, fossil energy carriers,
metallic ores, and non-metallic minerals. Note that the statistical territory varies once in this
period: the now German Sarre region was included in the French national statistics until 1959.
This has noticeable consequences since Sarre was quite important concerning metal ores.
Di erent methods exist to compute the material footprint of a country (Eurostat, 2015; Lutter
et al., 2016). Multi-Regional Input Output (MRIO) models permit to study and quantify the
dependency of countries regarding imports from other parts of the world (Giljum et al., 2015,
2007). Unfortunately, these data usually do not go back further than 1990. The bottom-up
coe cient approach is inappropriate for our macroeconomic scale. Indeed, it is very hard to
construct solid coe cients for a large number of especially highly processed products (Lutter
et al., 2016), especially for a long period. Moreover, we prefer not to implement a hybrid method
(MRIO-coe cient approach) that bears the risk of being too opaque.
While usually material footprints are calculated since 1990 (Wiedmann et al., 2015), the Eora
database provides time series since 1970 (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013). Figure A1 shows the graph
built from these data. Since the “gap” in 1997 has no consistent explanation (perhaps the Asian
financial crash had an impact but such a deep fall resembles more a statistical error), we deleted
this outlier from the series and replaced it by a value obtained through linear interpolation.
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Figure A1: Material footprint from 1970 to 2015 in tonne, with and without the 1997 correction.
Source: Data from Eora input-output database (Lenzen et al., 2013).
We then have two series: domestic material consumption (DMC = domestic extraction DE
+ physical trade balance PTB) since 1948 from Magalhães et al. (2019), and material footprint
(MF) from 1970 to 2015 from Eora. To cover the whole 1948-2015 period, we therefore need to
estimate MF from 1948 to 1969. It is worth recalling the formula of MF for any year t, for one
material category j œ{biomass, metal ores, non-metallic ores, fossil fuels}:
MFj,t = DEj,t +RTBj,t (1)
With RTBj,t the raw trade balance (that includes indirect material flows) for the considered
material category j. Since DEj,t is known, the key point to approximate the material footprint
is therefore to estimate RTBj,t. Our assumption is that indirect flows are proportional to trade
flows (for each material category): it allows us to approximate the unknown RTBj,t through the
known PTBj,t. Drawing from this we provide an estimated [RTBj,t for each type of material
flow.
1.1 Our estimation method
We estimate MF from 1948 to 1975 (see section 1.2 below). The MF values from 1976 onwards
for the four main categories come from the Eora database.
For each material category j œ{biomass, metal ores, non-metallic ores, fossil fuels}, for each
year t œ {1948, . . . , 2015}, we define
–j,t =
RTBj,t
PTBj,t
(2)
This ratio can be computed for 1976-2015: PTBj,t comes from Magalhães et al. (2019) and
RTBj,t =MFj,t ≠DEj,t is deduced from Eora. But we must estimate their unknown values for
2
the 1948-1975 period.
Then, for each j, we compute the median of the vector (–j,1976, . . . ,–j,2015). Table 1 provides
the values of for all the – over the whole period. The median estimator is suitable here since it
is not sensitive to extreme values (it is therefore well-known to be more robust than the mean
estimator). Defining the median ratio –¯j as:
–¯j = median(–j,t, t = 1976, . . . , 2015) (3)
We get –¯biomass = ≠3.93, –¯metal = 4.68, –¯non≠metal = 3.85, –¯fossil = 2.48.
We then find, for t œ {1948, . . . , 1975} and for each material category j:
[RTBj,t = –¯jPTBj,t (4)
and ‰MF j,t = DEj,t +[RTBj,t (5)
The MF values for 1976-2015 come from Eora.
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4
Note that for metals, multiplying the embodied metal in imported goods by 4.68 in 1976-2015
requires to assume that exported commodities in 1948-1975 have the same embodied content.
Nevertheless, France was then exporting a lot of iron ore, with less embodied metal than a man-
ufactured good (figure A2). We thus decided to split the metal category into two subcategories:
iron ore and others. We then applied the estimated coe cient to the second one only. This
choice is not arbitrary: It is well known that iron represents by far the main metal subcategory
(Scha artzik et al., 2016). That was necessary to avoid a negative MF for metals between 1948
and 1975, which made little sense, if at all1.
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Figure A2: Physical trade balance of iron ore (1948-1977). Data from Magalhães et al. (2019).
Concerning the iron ore trade, we used the coe cient of 1.27 that provides an approximation
of the gross ore needed to export one unit of concentrate content (Eurostat, 2018, p. 55). Of
course this is only a proxy – since iron content can vary a lot over time and between imports
and exports.
As for biomass, Wiedmann et al. (2015) suggest to break it down into two main subcategories
to gain additional insights into the use of biomass: i) crops for human consumption and ii) fodder
crops, crop residues, and grazed biomass. In the case of the present analysis, this was not needed.
Also, our estimate for biomass do not exhibit any strange values or trends.
1.2 Choice of estimation period
An important question concerns the length of the period we want to estimate: Do we use the
Eora data for the whole 1970-2015 period or do we split the data and if so, when and why ?
Using the same method, we tested all splits from 1970 to 1995 (26 splits). For the 1970s, we get
the following table.
1A negative material footprint is possible only if a country uses none of its material stock for domestic purpose
and exports all or a part of it. It can never happen at a large scale for such a long period, especially a period of
post-war reconstruction.
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Category 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Biomass -4.23 -4.18 -4.12 -4.06 -3.99 -3.96 -3.93 -3.87 -3.81 -3.80 -3.79
Metal 4.44 4.46 4.49 4.52 4.56 4.62 4.68 4.70 4.71 4.74 4.71
Non-metal 2.80 2.84 2.89 3.37 3.85 3.37 3.85 3.37 2.89 2.84 2.80
Fossil 2.44 2.45 2.46 2.47 2.48 2.48 2.48 2.48 2.46 2.45 2.46
Table 2: Estimated coe cients. Each column corresponds to a split: the 1976 column provides
the coe cients we found with this estimation method. The 1970 column corresponds to the
median applied to all coe cients from 1970 onward.
We excluded the first estimates (split in: 1970, 1971, 1972) because the last estimated value
of the series was much higher than the following Eora value (figure A3). This strong decrease
(in 1970, 1971 or 1972) does not match reality since these years of high GDP growth correspond
to a period of important increase in imports and domestic extraction (Magalhães et al., 2019).
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Figure A3: Comparison of material footprint estimates 1970 to 1975.
Therefore, we chose to split in 1975-1976 for a better accuracy of the estimation of the metal
category and to use Eora data from 1976 onwards. This allows us to avoid a gap generated by
later splits, e.g. splits in the years 1977 to 1980 that created a strong decrease followed by a
strong increase in the late 1970 (figure A4). The years 1948-1975 are thus estimated and Eora
data are used for the years 1976-2015. Obivously this approach is limited but we consider it
accurate enough to estimate the main trends.
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Figure A4: Comparison of MF metal estimates 1975 to 1980.
2 Relative trajectories in terms of GVA: disaggregated ma-
terials
When disagreggating the DMC/GVA and MF/GVA ratios (figure A5), we see that all materials
but metal indicate a relative decoupling trajectory. The biomass intensity of gross value added
continuously decreases in both domestic and footprint approaches for our time span. Non-metal
intensity increases during Fordism and decreases since the onset of Neoliberalism. Domestic fossil
fuel intensity decreases since the early 1960s while the footprint fossil fuel intensity has increased
during Fordism and decreases since the mid-1970s. As for metal, relative decoupling appears
to occur at the domestic level from the early 1960s to the early 1980s with a stabilization of
the metal/GVA ratio since then. The footprint metal intensity indicates a symmetrical pattern:
an increase from the early 1960s to the early 1980s and a stabilization since then. This reveals
a strong correlation of footprint metal with the GVA over a long period. This illustrates the
relocation of metallurgy, whose share in GVA went from 2.3% of GVA in 1959 to 1.3% of GVA
in 2015 according to OECD national accounting data in terms of NACE sectoral activities.
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Figure A5: Disaggregated domestic and footprint material intensity of GVA at factors cost in
kilo per 2010 euro.
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